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(1932), the court stated, "Good pleading neither requires nor permits
the pleading of evidence upon which the pleader relies to maintain his
action. Ultimate facts only should be set out. Ultimate facts are
nothing more than issuable, constitutive, or traversable facts essential
to the statement of the cause of action." A more liberal view Is taken
by the Iowa court in Dorman v. Credit Reference & Reporting ao. et
al., (Iowa) 241 N. W. 436 (1932). Although holding that a party can-
mot be required to set out evidence in his pleading, the court stated
that an appeal will not lie from a motion to strike.
The principal case illustrates the usual conflict as to this matter.
The defeidant there thought that the plaintiff should allege more spe-
cifically to what extent the sight of his eye had been impaired. Had
the plaintiff averred more specifically the defendant could have been
better prepared to meet the allegations with his evidence. It is clear
that the petition was sufficient to bring the case under the policy and
to give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's case against it. The
eminent judge was, therefore, correct in overruling the demurrer.
It is not often that the pleader makes his statements too ele-
mentary. The tendency is to the converse. But, in cases where evi-
dentary matter appears the remedy in this state is easily consum-
mated. The redundant matter may be stricken by a motion or by the
court on its own motion. Ky. Civil Code, section 121; City of Prince-
ton v. Baker et al., 237 Ky. 325, 35 S. W. (2d) 524 (1931). On the
other hand when a pleading is demurred to for not containing suffi-
cient facts and the demurrer is sustained, the pleader must either
elect to stand on his pleading or plead over. At least some of the
courts hold that if the pleader merely enters his exceptions and pleads
over he cannot then assign the ruling on the demurrer as error on ap-
peal. He must elect to stand on his pleading. Dorman v. Credit Ref-
erence & Reporting Co. et al., supra.
This matter should be left fairly up to the discretion of the trial
court. When we attempt to define "ultimate," "issuable," "travers-
able," or "constitutive" facts we encounter a task that is beyond our
human ability. Every case has different facts and conditions. The
best we can do is to lay down general rules. First, we should aim at
brevity, simplicity and clearness, guarding against undue verbosity
and repetition. Second, we should, with substantial certainty, give the
Opponent fair notice of the case or defense thereto.
JAs. T. HATOHE.
MINES .ND MiNRALs-DAxAGES FOR TRESPASS.-In the recent case
of Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 245 Ky. 256, 53 S. W.
(2d) 538 (1932), it was said of one who takes coal from land on which
he has no right to mine, that if he were a trespasser through Innocent
mistake and not guilty of an intentional taking, the measure of dam-
ages he would be liable to pay would be the value of the coal as It lay
In the ground or the reasonable and customary royalty, rather than
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the full value of the coal after it had been mined, as in the case of a
wilful trespasser.
Such a rule allows one who converts the property of another by
innocent mistake to make exactly the same profit on the coal he mines
as he would have made if he had negotiated with, and obtained from
the owner of the land, the right to mine the coal, since all he has to
pay In either case is the customary royalty. This is going beyond
making an innocent man whole, it is allowing him to profit by acts,
which although innocently done, are nevertheless wrongful and in-
jurious to others. A better rule would appear to be to require the tres-
passer, even though innocent, to pay back at least the value of the coal
after it was mined less the cost of mining it-no profit being allowed
as would be under the royalty measure. The position taken by the
court has, however, a long line of authority to support it. Ashurst v.
Cooper's Admr., 232 Ky. 498, 23 S. W. (2d) 916 (1930); Middle Creek
Coal Co. v. Harris, 217 Ky. 620, 290 S. W. 468 (1927); Sandy River
Coal Co. v. White House Coal Co., 125 Ky. 278, 101 S. W. 319 (1907).
It has universally been held that where he who mined coal on the
land of another was a wilful trespasser without color of title, the
measure of damages to be paid should be the value of the coal after
it had been mined. North Jellico Coal Co. v. Helton, 187 Ky. 394, 219
S. W. 185 (1920); Thompson v. Dentzell, 232 Ky. 755, 24 S. W. (2d)
607 (1930); New Dominion Oil and Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183,
221 S. W. 245 (1920); Hendricks v. Spring Valley Mines, 58 Cal. 190,
49 Am. Rep. 257 (1881); Bender v. Brosh, 103 Tex. 329, 127 S. W. 168
(1910). But the difficult question is what elements are necessary to
bring the trespass within the class of innocent trespasses rather than
that of wilful trespasses?
The court in the Harlan Coal Co., case, supra, held that the tres-
passer came within the class of innocent trespassers even though he
knew of the claim the other party made to the land and knew that the
title was not a settled matter. A number of tests have been laid down
for determining when one comes within the class of innocent tres-
passers, the most liberal of which seems to be the view that all that
is required is that the trespasser honestly believe that he is within
his rights and have no intention of trespassing on another's land.
United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 177 Fed. 481 (1902). This
seems to be going too far in favor of the trespasser. He should not
only believe that he has a right to mine the land, but should also have
good reason to believe it. In a case in which he knows there is an
adverse claimant, as in the Harlan Coal Co. case, supra, he knows that
his rights are questionable, and if he goes on without having cleared
them up, he should be considered a wrongful trespasser. Griffith v.
Clark Mfg. Co., 212 Ky. 498, 279 S. W. 971 (1926), contains a good
statement on this matter, "Intent being a state of mind, can but sel-
dom be proven by direct evidence. For this reason the law presumes
that a party intends the natural consequences of his acts, and if he
has the means of ascertaining the facts, but refuses to use these
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means, and reckless of the rights of the true owner, appropriates the
property to his own use, the law will presume he did it Intentionally
and wilfully." Also in Central Coal and Joke Co. v. Penny, 173 Fed.
340 (1909), "An intentional or reckless omission to ascertain the boun-
daries of land of his victim for the purpose of maintaining Ignorance
regarding them, or in reckless disregard of them, is as fatal to the
claim of a trespasser to limit the recovery of damages against him to
the lower measure, as is the intentional or wilful trespass or taking."
While k good many cases go as far as the Harlan Coal Co. case In
stretching the innocent trespasser class, a large number of cases have
followed a narrower doctrine, such as that followed in Griffith v. Clark
Mf1g. Co., supra, and Central Coal and Coke (o. v. Penny, supra, above,
and this seems to be the better rule. There should not only be an hon-
est belief that he is acting within his rights, but also a reasonable
foundation for such belief under the circumstances.
JosEPH D. WnnB.
EASEENTs-THE DOcTRINE OF IMPLIED GwAiT ON QUASI-EASE-
WENTS.-The subject of creating easements by implication by refer-
ence to a previous use is properly divided into two separate and dis-
tinct divisions, e. g., "implied grant," and "implied reservation" of an
easement corresponding to a pre-existing quasi-easement. Tiffany,
Outlines of Real Property, § 274 (1929). For the purpose of this note
we shall confine ourselves solely to the former division, that Is, the
doctrine of "implied grant" of an easement corresponding to a pre-
existing quasi-easement, which means, as used in this comment, the
creation of an easement by the conveyance of land for the benefit of
the land conveyed, as against land retained by the grantor. 2 Tiffany,
Real Prop. (2d ed. 1920), 1270.
Before going further it is necessary to define the term "quasi-ease-
ment" in order to determine when the doctrine of implied grant is
applicable. It has been asserted by eminent authorities that a "quasi
easement" is the utilization of a part of an entire tract of land, or a
portion of two or more adjoining parcels, for the benefit of the other
land, where the entire tract or adjoining parcels are owned by one and
the same person. The reason being that one cannot have an easement
in his own land. Saundeys v. Oliff, Moore 467 (1697); 2 Tiffany, Real
Property (2d ed. 1920), 1272. But that does not explain why it is
called a "quasi-easement." Tiffany, supra, says that it is not called
such because it creates any sort of legal relation, but because such an
expression is a convenient one, and expresses fairly well the meaning
of the term.
That portion of the land which receives the benefit has been desig-
nated by judicial opinions and text writers as the "quasi-dominant
tenement," and that part upon which the burden rests is referred to
as the "quasi-servient tenement." 2 Tiffany, Real Prop. (2d ed. 1920),
1272; and cases cited.
The specific question to be discussed in this note arises out of the
